Men think about sex 5,000 times a year

 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/6950545/Men-think-about-sex-5000-times-a-year.html

Men think about sex almost 5,000 times a year – but only get down to doing it 104 times, a new study has found.

Researchers found the average male turns their thoughts to sexual intercourse 13 times a day – a total of 4,745 times every year.

Almost a third even admitted it is often the first thing they think about when they wake up in the mornings.

In comparison, women think about sex just five times day – or 1,825 times a year.

But when it comes to actually having sex, men have to make do with it an average of just twice a week, or 104 times a year.

A spokesman for market research company www.Onepoll.com said: ''Men are well-known for thinking about sex a lot, but to find out exactly how often is staggering.

''It seems blokes have sex on the brain whether they are going through a dry spell or jumping between the sheets on a regular basis.

''They can't even get away from the sexy thoughts when they first wake up in the morning.

''So when you catch your man staring into space, you know what he's likely to be thinking about.''

The study of 3,000 people also showed that despite the difference in the amount of times men think about sex and actually do it, almost three quarters claim they are happy about the amount of sex they were getting.

But just 58 per cent of women said the same.

And 43 per cent of couples also admitted arguing over who instigates the lovemaking, with men most likely to make the first move.

Researchers also found one in three guys think a candlelit dinner is the best way of getting a woman in the mood, followed by a relaxing massage.

But women are more likely to play romantic music or cook their partner's favourite meal to try and get them into bed.

Sex objects: Pictures shift men's view of women

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2009/feb/16/sex-object-photograph

Men are more likely to think of women as objects if they have looked at sexy pictures of females beforehand, psychologists said yesterday. 

 Researchers used brain scans to show that when straight men looked at pictures of women in bikinis, areas of the brain that normally light up in anticipation of using tools, like spanners and screwdrivers, were activated. 

 Scans of some of the men found that a part of the brain associated with empathy for other people's emotions and wishes shut down after looking at the pictures. 

 Susan Fiske, a psychologist at Princeton University in New Jersey, said the changes in brain activity suggest sexy images can shift the way men perceive women, turning them from people to interact with, to objects to act upon. 

The finding confirms a long-suspected effect of sexy images on the way women are perceived, and one which persists in workplaces and the wider world today, Fiske said. 

 "When there are sexualised images in the workplace, it's hard for people not to think about their female colleagues in those terms. It spills over from the images to the workplace," she said. 

 Speaking at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Chicago yesterday, Fiske said the findings called into question the impact of sexualised images of women that might be pinned on workplace walls or sent around offices where there was a strong locker-room culture. 

 "I'm not saying there should be censorship, but people need to be aware of the associations people will have in their minds," Fiske said. 

 In the study, Fiske's team put straight men into an MRI brain scanner and showed them images of either clothed men and women, or more scantily clad men and women. When they took a memory test afterwards, the men best remembered images of bikini-clad women whose heads had been digitally removed. 

 The brain scans showed that when men saw the images of the women's bodies, activity increased in part of the brain called the premotor cortex, which is involved in urges to take action. The same area lights up before using power tools to do DIY. "It's as if they immediately thought to act on theses bodies," Fiske said. 

 In the final part of the study, Fiske asked the men to fill in a questionnaire that was used to assess how sexist they were. The brain scans showed that men who scored highest had very little activity in the prefrontal cortex and other brain regions that are involved with understanding another person's feelings and intentions. "They're reacting to these women as if they're not fully human," Fiske said.

കുട്ടികള്‍ക്ക് വേണ്ടി ഒരു പ്രതിരോധം; അഫ്ഘാനിസ്ഥാന്‍ ഒരു അന്വാഷണ പഠനം ഭാ...

Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths by Jonathan Steele - review

 

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/sep/25/ghosts-of-afghanistan-jonathan-steele

The Observer

History books

Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths by Jonathan Steele - review

Just as the Soviets ran aground in Afghanistan so America is busy repeating their mistakes, writes former diplomat Rodric Braithwaite

A young boy walks past an ex-Soviet tank, which was used by Taliban forces and then by the Afghan army, in Takhta Pul, east of Kandahar. Photograph: Eugene Hoshiko/AP

Rodric Braithwaite

Sun 25 Sep 2011 00.05 BST

6

Afghanistan, Jonathan Steele writes in his new book, is full of ghosts. There are the ghosts of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and their numerous successors – invaders who were able to conquer the place, but could not hold it. "Ghosts" is the word the Russians used for the mujahideen guerrillas who merged with the peaceful population during the day and struck during the night – who fought the Russians in the 1980s and are fighting us today.

Steele has covered events in Afghanistan for many years, and he skewers with palpable glee the myths and half-truths that are peddled by politicians, generals, official spokesmen, and too many commentators. Perhaps the most damaging in his eyes is the myth that the destruction of the Taliban would eliminate the threat from the Arab terrorists who felled the twin towers in New York. That myth has made it all but impossible for us to construct a sensible strategy for Afghanistan.

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And so he now writes with increasing despair about the failing efforts of the United States and its allies to build a viable Afghan state out of the physical, institutional and human rubble left behind by three decades of civil war and foreign intervention. A central theme is "the similarity of the Soviet and US interventions and the lessons that ought to be learned". In spite of failing to defeat the mujahideen, Steele writes, the Soviet leadership "had the sense to change course".

When the Russians invaded, Afghanistan had a fairly coherent state apparatus, built up since the end of the 19th century, and an economy which, though very backward, was beginning to develop thanks to American and above all Soviet aid. Most modern Afghan leaders were reformers, but their attempts to change Afghan society, especially when it came to the treatment of women, often met with bloody resistance.

The Afghan communists were reformers too. But they were a small and murderously fractious clique, and they killed their opponents in very large numbers. They soon faced violent uprisings, especially in the countryside.

The Russians invaded in December 1979 not as part of a plan for the world victory of communism, as our propaganda had it, but to protect the security of their southern frontier against Islamic unrest and American intrigue. Senior Soviet generals and officials had warned against getting mixed up in an Afghan civil war. They pointed to the unhappy precedent of Vietnam. Their leaders went ahead nevertheless, as much as anything because they could not think of a better alternative. Change the Afghan leader, train up his army and his police, and then – they hoped – the Soviet troops would be able to leave in a matter of months. It did not happen. The Russians were soon sucked into just the quagmire that the sceptics had feared. Before long they were looking for a way out.

The man who eventually did it was Mikhail Gorbachev. By the time he came to power in 1985, Gorbachev firmly believed that the issue could not be settled by force. He was determined to cut the Gordian knot through negotiation. He was supported by his political colleagues and by his generals, who did not try to argue that they could achieve "victory" if only they were given more troops and more time. He told the Afghan government that his soldiers would be out within 18 months. It still took three years of difficult negotiation before the Soviet army marched away, undefeated on the battlefield but profoundly demoralised by nine years of useless war. And though the Russians left their man Najibullah behind them, they did not bequeath him a wider settlement that would command the support of his enemies among the mujahideen and in Pakistan. The consequence was a bloody civil war, which ended in the victory of the Taliban.

Steele contrasts this record with that of President Obama who, unlike Gorbachev, came to power believing that his war in Afghanistan was a "necessary" war. He thought – at least at first – that if the Afghans adopted western standards of good governance and financial probity they would, by some alchemy, no longer be willing to give cover to the Taliban. Instead of looking for ways to negotiate with the insurgents, he listened to his generals, who persuaded him that they could beat the Taliban if they were given the tools to finish the job.

That has not happened. Despite tired claims of progress by official spokesmen, the Taliban continue to advance. The Afghan government remains unconvincing, hamstrung by arrogant foreign advice, corrupted by an overdose of foreign money. Steele believes that the only way forward is for the Americans to change course, like the Russians did, to commit themselves wholeheartedly to a far-reaching settlement between Kabul and all its enemies, under which the foreign armies can withdraw in good order. The Afghans, helped by their foreign friends, can then devote themselves to rebuilding their shattered country in peace.

That is an ambitious objective. It seems more likely that the Americans and their allies will eventually leave as the Russians did, without the broad settlement that alone can ensure that the civil war does not resume. As we leave, we will doubtless explain away our failure by blaming the ungrateful Afghans for their unwillingness to adopt our western ways. And meanwhile both Afghans and foreigners will continue to die in another useless war.

Sir Rodric Braithwaite is the author of Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 (Profile).

Saur Revolution

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Saur Revolution
Part of the Cold War, origins of the Afghanistan conflict, and the prelude to the Soviet–Afghan War
Outside the presidential palace gate (Arg) in Kabul, the day after the Saur revolution on 28 April 1978
Date 27–28 April 1978 (7 Sawr/Ghwayai 1357 SH) (1 day) Location Afghanistan Result PDPA victory Overthrow and killings of Mohammed Daoud Khan and his family members Purge and killings of Khan's supporters[1] Fall of the Republic of Afghanistan and establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Eventual Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan Beginning of the ongoing Afghanistan conflict
Belligerents
Republic of Afghanistan	PDP of Afghanistan
Commanders and leaders
Mohammed Daoud Khan †  Abdul Qadir Nuristani †  Ghulam Haidar Rasuli †  Sayyid Abdullah  †	Nur Muhammad Taraki[2]  Hafizullah Amin  Mohammad Aslam Watanjar[2]  Abdul Qadir  Babrak Karmal[2]
Units involved
Presidential Guard Afghan Army units Afghan Police units	Afghan Army units
Casualties and losses
Unknown number of deaths

show v t e Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)

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The Saur Revolution (/saʊər/; Dari: إنقلاب ثور‎ or ۷ ثور (literally 7th Saur); Pashto: د ثور انقلاب‎), also romanized Sowr Revolution,^[3] and alternatively called the April Revolution^[4] or April Coup,^[3] was the process by which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew General Mohammed Daoud Khan on 27–28 April 1978, who had himself taken power in the 1973 Afghan coup d'état and established an autocratic one-party system in the country. Daoud Khan and most of his family were killed at the presidential palace by military officers in support of the PDPA.^[5] The revolution resulted in the creation of a Soviet-aligned government with Nur Muhammad Taraki as President (General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council). Saur or Sowr is the Dari (Persian) name of the second month of the Solar Hijri calendar, the month in which the uprising took place.^[6]

The revolution was ordered by PDPA member Hafizullah Amin, who would become a significant figure in the revolutionary government; at a press conference in New York in June 1978, Amin claimed that the event was not a coup, but a revolution by the "will of the people".^[7] The coup involved heavy fighting and resulted in as many as 2,000 deaths, both military and civilian.^[8] The Saur Revolution was a significant event in Afghanistan's history, marking the onset of 43 years of conflict in the country.^[9]

Contents

• 1Background
• 2The revolution
  • 2.1International reaction
• 3Government after the revolution
  • 3.1Oppression of anti-revolutionaries
  • 3.2Royal family
• 4Legacy
• 5See also
• 6References
• 7External links

Background[edit]

With the support and assistance of minority political party the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Mohammed Daoud Khan had taken power in the 1973 Afghan coup d'état by overthrowing the monarchy of King Zahir Shah,^[10][11] and had established the first Republic of Afghanistan.

President Daoud was convinced that closer ties and military support from the Soviet Union would allow Afghanistan to take control of Pashtun lands in northwest Pakistan. However, Daoud, who was ostensibly committed to a policy of non-alignment, became uneasy over Soviet attempts to dictate Afghanistan's foreign policy, and relations between the two countries deteriorated.^[12]

Under the secular government of Daoud, factionalism and rivalry developed in the PDPA, with two main factions being the Parcham and Khalq factions. On 17 April 1978, a prominent member of the Parcham, Mir Akbar Khyber, was murdered.^[13]: 771 Although the government issued a statement deploring the assassination, Nur Mohammad Taraki of the PDPA charged that the government was responsible, a belief that was shared by much of the Kabul intelligentsia. PDPA leaders apparently feared that Daoud was planning to eliminate them.^[13]

During the funeral ceremonies for Khyber a protest against the government occurred, and shortly thereafter most of the leaders of PDPA, including Babrak Karmal, were arrested. Hafizullah Amin was put under house arrest, which gave him a chance to order an uprising, one that had been slowly coalescing for more than two years.^[6] Amin, without having the authority, instructed the Khalqist army officers to overthrow the government.

The revolution[edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (March 2018)

The day after the Saur revolution in Kabul

Preliminary steps for the coup came in April, when a tank commander under Daoud warned of intelligence suggesting an attack on Kabul in the near future, specifically April 27. On the commander's recommendation, tanks were positioned around the Arg, the national palace. On the 27th, the tanks turned their guns on the palace. The tank commander who made the request had, in secret, defected to Khalq beforehand.^[14]

According to an eyewitness, the first signs of the impending coup in Kabul, at about noon on 27 April, were reports of a tank column headed toward the city, smoke of unknown origin near the Ministry of Defense, and armed men, some in military uniform, guarding Ariana Circle, a major intersection. The first shots heard were near the Ministry of Interior in the downtown Shahr-e Naw section of Kabul, where a company of policemen apparently confronted an advancing tank column. From there the fighting spread to other areas of the city. Later that afternoon, the first fighter planes, Sukhoi Su-7s, came in low and fired rockets at the national palace in the center of the city. In early evening, an announcement was broadcast on government-owned Radio Afghanistan that the Khalq were overthrowing the Daoud government. The use of the word Khalq, and its traditional association with the communists in Afghanistan, made clear that the PDPA was leading the coup, and also that the rebels had captured the radio station.^[15]

The aerial attacks on the palace intensified about midnight as six Su-7s made repeated rocket attacks, lighting up the city. The next morning, 28 April, Kabul was mostly quiet, although the sound of gunfire could still be heard on the southern side of the city. As the people of Kabul ventured out of their homes they realized that the rebels were in complete control of the city and learned that President Daoud Khan and his brother Naim had been killed early that morning. A group of soldiers had surrounded the heavily-damaged palace and demanded their surrender. Instead, Daoud and Naim, pistols in hand, charged out of the palace at the soldiers, and were shot and killed.^[15] In addition, the Defense Minister of Daoud's cabinet Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, Interior Minister Abdul Qadir Nuristani, and Vice President Sayyid Abdullah were also killed.^[16]

The coup marked the end of power of the Barakzai dynasty after 152 years.

For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, despotism and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended and all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan.

— Announcement on Radio Afghanistan at 7pm^[17]

International reaction[edit]

In a May 28, 1978, cable^[18] from the United States embassy in Kabul to the US embassies in Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi and Tehran, the US Liaison Office in Beijing, and the Secretary of State, the US ambassador in Kabul Theodore L. Eliot quotes the Chinese ambassador in Kabul Huang Ming-Ta's characterization of the new regime as "undeniably controlled by pro-soviet communists,"^[18] and him stating that chairman Taraki and Hafizullah Amin had expressed intentions to be nonaligned.^[18] Huang Ming-Ta also observed that the Soviet Union had great influence in Afghanistan, and would provide any assistance it might need, but speculated that the Soviet Union might find it an expensive venture. Huang Ming-Ta expressed "that there might be some changes in Afghanistan within the next years, and that American programs should continue in Afghanistan".^[18]

Government after the revolution[edit]

Main article: Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Saur Revolution is [the] continuation of [the] Great October Revolution

— Hafizullah Amin, quoted on October 7, 1978^[19]

The revolution was initially welcomed by many people in Kabul, who were dissatisfied with the Daoud government. Before the civilian government was established, Afghan National Army Air Corps colonel Abdul Qadir and the PDPA Revolutionary Council led the country for three days from 27 April 1978. Eventually a civilian government under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki of the Khalq faction was formed. In Kabul, the initial cabinet appeared to be carefully constructed to alternate ranking positions between Khalqists and Parchamites. Taraki (a Khalqist) was Prime Minister, Karmal (a Parchamite) was senior Deputy Prime Minister, and Hafizullah Amin (a Khalqist) was foreign minister. The unity between Khalq and Parcham was only brief: Amin and General Mohammad Aslam Watanjar conveyed in a meeting that the revolution was the work of Khalq and that Parcham had no part of it.^[20] Taraki and Amin in early July relieved most of the Parchamites from their government positions. Karmal was sent abroad as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. In August 1978, Taraki and Amin claimed to have uncovered a plot and executed or imprisoned several cabinet members, even imprisoning General Abdul Qadir, the military leader of the Saur Revolution until the Soviet invasion and subsequent change in leadership in late 1979. In September 1979, it was Taraki's turn to become a victim of the Revolution, as Amin overthrew and executed him.^[21][22]

The government once in power, as the PDPA had said before, denied that it was communist.

What is most ridiculous is the branding of Afghan National and Democratic Revolutionaries as communists. Already the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [Taraki] has openly and boldly declared that the reactionary press has deformed and twisted the facts and no political party as communist party ever existed or exists in Afghanistan.

— The Kabul Times, May 6, 1978^[23]

At first the new government had a moderate approach and reforms were not strongly felt; however from late October the PDPA launched drastic reforms that struck the socioeconomic tribal structure of rural Afghanistan.^[24] In a "disastrous symbolic move",^[24] it changed the national flag from the traditional black, red and Islamic green color to a near-copy of the red flag of the Soviet Union, a provocative affront to the people of the conservative country.^[21] It prohibited usury, without having in place any alternative for peasants who relied on the traditional, if exploitative, credit system in the countryside. That led to an agricultural crisis and a fall in agricultural production.^[25][26] Such reforms were abruptly introduced and enforced, without preliminary pilots.^[24] Land reform was criticized by one journalist as "confiscating land in a haphazard manner that enraged everyone, benefited no one, and reduced food production," and the "first instance of organized, nationwide repression in Afghanistan's modern history."^[27]

The PDPA, an advocate of equal rights for women, declared the equality of the sexes.^[28] The PDPA made a number of statements on women's rights, declaring equality of the sexes and introduced women to political life. A prominent example was Anahita Ratebzad, who was a major Marxist-Leninist leader and a member of the Revolutionary Council. Ratebzad wrote the famous May 28, 1978 New Kabul Times editorial, which declared: "Privileges which women, by right, must have are equal education, job security, health services, and free time to rear a healthy generation for building the future of the country ... Educating and enlightening women is now the subject of close government attention."^[29] Women were already guaranteed freedoms under the 1964 Constitution, but the PDPA went further by declaring full equality.

Oppression of anti-revolutionaries[edit]

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (September 2019) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

The revolution also introduced severe repression of a kind previously unknown in Afghanistan. According to journalist and CNAS member Robert D. Kaplan, while Afghanistan had historically been extremely poor and underdeveloped, it "had never known very much political repression" until 1978.^[27]

The soldiers' knock on the door in the middle of the night, so common in many Arab and African countries, was little known in Afghanistan, where a central government simply lacked the power to enforce its will outside of Kabul. Taraki's coup changed all that. Between April 1978 and the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Afghan communists executed 27,000 political prisoners at the sprawling Pul-i-Charki prison six miles east of Kabul. Many of the victims were village mullahs and headmen who were obstructing the modernization and secularization of the intensely religious Afghan countryside. By Western standards, this was a salutary idea in the abstract. But it was carried out in such a violent way that it alarmed even the Soviets.

— Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ^[27]

Kaplan states that it was the Saur Revolution and its harsh land reform program, rather than the December 1979 Soviet invasion "as most people in the West suppose", that "ignited" the mujahidin revolt against the Kabul authorities and prompted the refugee exodus to Pakistan.^[27]

Royal family[edit]

Alongside the killing of most of Daoud's family during the coup, other members of the former House of Barakzai were jailed. All royal property were seized, members were deprived of Afghan citizenship, and the flow of money to the exiled king Mohammed Zahir Shah and his wife in Italy were halted.^[30]

The Khalqists compiled a list of royal people to be executed after the coup. Prince Ali Abdul Seraj, a great-grandson of the 19th century emir Abdur Rahman Khan, was on the list and managed to flee Afghanistan with his wife and child while disguised as a hippie, joining a bus full of British and Australian hashish smokers.^[31]

Legacy[edit]

See also: Soviet–Afghan War

After a few months, the Khalqist regime pushed hard for socialist reforms and was brutal in its repression of opposition, arresting many without charge. The regime alienated a wide variety of people, including tribal and clan leaders, Islamists, Maoists, Western-educated teachers, and traditional religious leaders, all becoming victims of the Khalqists.^[32] Discontent fomented amongst the people of Afghanistan, and the first anti-government revolts began in Kunar Province, in October 1978. With regime brutality only increasing, and several uprisings the following year (most notably that in Herat) leaving most provinces in the country under guerilla control,^[33] troops from the USSR entered Afghanistan in December, citing the Brezhnev Doctrine as basis for their intervention. Insurgent groups fought Soviet troops and the PDPA government for more than nine years until the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Instability continued in Afghanistan, with war still continuing to plague the entire country for more than four decades after the revolution.

In 1991, PDPA member Babrak Karmal who headed the Parcham faction and served as president after the invasion, denounced the Saur Revolution, saying:

It was the greatest crime against the people of Afghanistan. Parcham's leaders were against armed actions because the country was not ready for a revolution... I knew that people would not support us if we decided to keep power without such support."^[34]

See also[edit]

• Afghanistan portal

• Haqiqat-e Inquilab-e Saur, a newspaper named after the Saur Revolution
• Afghanistan-Soviet Union relations

References[edit]

1. ^ "1978: Afghan coup rebels claim victory". 29 April 1978.
2. ^ Jump up to:^a b c "The KGB in Afghanistan: Mitrokhin Documents Disclosed". Federation of American Scientists. 25 February 2002.
3. ^ Jump up to:^a b "TOWARDS EQUALITY: How Afghan women conquer 27% share in parliament after decades of war | The Asahi Shimbun: Breaking News, Japan News and Analysis". The Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
4. ^ "An April Day That Changed Afghanistan 1: Four decades after the leftist takeover". Afghanistan Analysts Network - English (in Pashto). 2018-04-25. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
5. ^ "Mohammad Daud Khan". Afghanland.com. 2000. Archived from the original on 2017-08-17. Retrieved 2018-03-11.
6. ^ Jump up to:^a b Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Yale University Press. pp. 104–105. ISBN 9780300095197.
7. ^ AP Archive (2015-07-24), SYND 6 6 78 AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZULLAH PRESS CONFERENCE ON RECENT COUP, retrieved 2018-03-11
8. ^ "There was, therefore, little to hinder the assault mounted by the rebel 4th Armored Brigade, led by Major Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, who had also been prominent in Daoud's own coup five years before. Watanjar first secured the airport, where the other coup leader, Colonel Abdul Qadir, left by helicopter for the Bagram air base. There he took charge and organized air strikes on the royal palace, where Daoud and the presidential guard were conducting a desperate defense. Fighting continued the whole day and into the night, when the defenders were finally overwhelmed. Daoud and almost all of his family members, including women and children, died in the fighting. Altogether there were possibly as many as two thousand fatalities, both military and civilian." p. 88 of Ewans, Martin (2002) Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics HarperCollins, New York, Page 88 ISBN 0-06-050507-9
9. ^ "An April Day That Changed Afghanistan 1: Four decades after the leftist takeover". 25 April 2018.
10. ^ "Afghanistan: 20 years of bloodshed". BBC News. 1998-04-26. Retrieved 2018-03-12.
11. ^ "Daoud's Republic". Countrystudies.us. Retrieved 22 December 2013.
12. ^ Steele, Jonathan (2012-01-01). Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground. Counterpoint Press. pp. 64–65. ISBN 9781582437873.
13. ^ Jump up to:^a b Dupree, Louis (2014-07-14). Afghanistan. Princeton University Press. p. 771. ISBN 9781400858910.
14. ^ Ansary, Tamim (2012). Games Without Rules: the often interrupted history of Afghanistan. New York: Public Affairs. p. 177. ISBN 978-1-61039-094-1.
15. ^ Jump up to:^a b Thompson, Larry Clinton. "The 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan". American Diplomacy. AFSA. Retrieved 5 Sep 2020.
16. ^ Adamec, Ludwig W. (2012). Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan. ISBN 9780810878150.
17. ^ Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-91, Anthony Hyman
18. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d "Chinese Ambassador Comments on Afghanistan". May 28, 1978.
19. ^ "Before Taliban". publishing.cdlib.org.
20. ^ "Afghanistan". publishing.cdlib.org.
21. ^ Jump up to:^a b Arnold, Anthony (1985). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 74–75, 77, 83, 86. ISBN 9780817982133. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
22. ^ Clements, Frank (2003). Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. p. 207. ISBN 9781851094028. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
23. ^ https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1106&context=afghanuno
24. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Larry P. Goodson (2011). Afghanistan's Endless War. University of Washington Press. p. 55, 56. ISBN 978-0295801582.
25. ^ "The "Great Saur Revolution". Workers' Liberty. Retrieved 2011-04-06.
26. ^ "Afghanistan – COMMUNISM, REBELLION, AND SOVIET INTERVENTION". Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
27. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Kaplan, Robert D. (1990). Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. pp. 115–116. ISBN 978-0395521328. Retrieved 17 March 2018.
28. ^ Gibbs, David N. (June 2006). "Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan". Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2. Retrieved 18 March 2018.
29. ^ Prashad, Vijay (2001-09-15). "War Against the Planet". ZMag. Archived from the original on 2008-01-27. Retrieved 2008-03-21.
30. ^ Times, Paul Hofmann Special to The New York (1979-04-29). "Afghan King, In Rome Exile, Tightens Belt". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
31. ^ "Afghan "prince" who would be tribal president". Reuters. 2009-03-06. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
32. ^ https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/291156cd-c8e3-4620-a5e1-d3117ed7fb93/ajpreport_20050718.pdf
33. ^ https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf
34. ^ "Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths by Jonathan Steele - review". The Guardian. 25 September 2011. Retrieved 18 March 2018.

External links[edit]

• Surviving the 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan, a personal account of American Larry Clinton Thompson's experiences in the Saur Revolution
• How I escaped from jail in Afghanistan by Ismail Sloan, another personal account of an American who traveled to Afghanistan to rescue assets shortly after the revolution and during Daud Khan's short-lived government

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Categories: 

• 1978 in Afghanistan
• Conflicts in 1978
• Communism in Afghanistan
• Communist revolutions
• Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
• People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
• Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)
• 1970s coups d'état and coup attempts
• April 1978 events in Asia
• 20th-century revolutions
• Military coups in Afghanistan

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Edit links

• This page was last edited on 26 November 2021, at 12:05 (UTC).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saur_Revolution